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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TITANIUM M E T A L S CORPORA-
TION OF AMERICA, a Delaware cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SPACE METALS, INC., a corporation, 
and VALLEY BANK & TRUST COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
13474 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a suit by the plaintiff-respondent againts the 
defendant-appellant Bank in contract on a letter of credit. 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, sitting without a jury. The Honorable Jo-
seph G. Jeppson rendered a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, Titanium Metals Corporation of America, and 
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against appellant, for the sum of $54,132.72 and costs of 
$22.00. The court found as a matter of fact and law that 
defendant Valley Bank and Trust Company, had obligated 
itself under a letter of credit and had waived certain con-
ditions thereof. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant, Valley Bank and Trust Com-
pany seeks reversal of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential facts are neither complicated nor dis-
puted. The plaintiff, Titanium Metals Corporation of 
America, sold merchandise to the defendant, Space Met-
als, Inc. Space Metals, Inc. requested the appellant, Val-
ley Bank and Trust Company, to furnish it with Letters 
of Credit or Guarantee. Three critical letters of either 
guaranty or credit were issued by Valley Bank and Trust 
Company, hereinafter referred to as "Bank" to Titanium 
Metals Corporation of America, hereinafter referred to as 
"Titanium". 
The first letter guaranteed the payment of invoices 
(R. 37). All invoices submitted by Titanium to Bank 
were paid (R. 34). 
The terms of the second letter, committing the Bank's 
credit differed from the terms of the first letter. This 
letter was issued by the Bank on October 8th, 1968, and 
the critical language is: 
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3 
" . . . to pay all of your collection drafts upon pre-
sentation or due date until December 31st, 1968 
(R. 38)." (Emphasis added.) 
Titanium continued to send invoices. These invoices 
were presented by the Bank to Space Metals, Inc., its 
customer, who from time to time purchased cashier checks 
from Bank and Bank mailed the cashier checks to Titan-
ium. All of the invoices that were furnished to Space 
Metals, Inc. by Bank during the period of the second 
letter were paid by Space Metals, Inc. to Titanium (R. 
34 and R. 165). 
The original of each invoice was sent to Space Metals, 
Inc. and only a copy was sent to Bank (R. 35). 
The Bank advised the customer of receipt of an in-
voice and in each case, where an invoice was paid, Space 
Metals, Inc. arranged for the funding of the invoice, pur-
chased a cashier check and paid the same. (Testimony 
of Griff Williams, President of Space Metals, Inc. R. 182.) 
The Bank never paid for an invoice (Bank Officer 
R. 168, Space Metals Officer R. 182). 
On March 3rd, 1969, the third letter was issued by 
Bank and it stated as follows: 
"We have agreed . . . to pay all of your collection 
drafts upon presentation or due date for a period 
of ninety days . . ." (R. 39, P. 3). (Emphasis 
added.) 
Thereafter merchandise, accompanied by invoices, was 
shipped by Titanium to the defendant, Space Metals, Inc. 
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Copies of the invoices relating to the said shipments 
(seven shipments were covered) were mailed to, and re-
ceived by appellant, Bank. The first invoice was paid by 
Space Metals, Inc., the remaining six invoices were re-
turned, without payment (R. 35, 36). 
None of the invoices was accompanied by a collection 
draft or collection drafts, nor were any drafts with re-
spect thereto furnished to appellant at any other time (R. 
35). 
Valley Bank and Trust Company did not receive any 
drafts from Titanium (R. 166, R. 200). The Bank cashier 
testified that if the draft had been received, "We would 
have paid the draft and notified the customer" (R. 200). 
Titanium knew what a draft was and used them regu-
larly in its business: 
"Well, we do use the drafts in our business. A 
draft is a check drawn on a customer — drawn 
by us which the bank accepts and remits" (R. 
148). (Testimony of Titanium Credit Manager.) 
Titanium did not issue or furnish to Bank any drafts 
at any time (R. 35). 
Appellant transmitted to the plaintiff written advices 
to the effect that "we return herewith unpaid." These 
advices were returned attached to the invoice copies. 
There is no evidence of any change or amendment to the 
letter of credit. The pleadings raised no question of waiver 
and it would appear that the theory of waiver was first 
considered by the court during the course of trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE APPELLANT, VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, WAIVED THE 
TERMS OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT BE-
CAUSE WAIVER WAS NOT PLED. 
It appears clear from the findings of fact, that the 
trial court's decision was based on a finding of fact (No. 
6) and a conclusion of law (No. 3) that the defendant, 
Valley Bank and Trust Company, waived the requirement 
of collection drafts (R. 106). Therefore, the issue is, 
whether or not, as a matter of law and fact, a waiver was 
established. 
The plaintiff, Titanium Metals Corporation, did not 
plead waiver. The general rule supported by a preponder-
ance of courts, is that a waiver must be pleaded specially. 
This is the rule unless there is no opportunity to plead 
waiver. 
The general rule is set forth in Commercial Standard 
Insurance Co. v. Remay, 58 Idaho 302, 72 P. 2d 859, where 
the court found that, when waiver is not pled specially, 
evidence is inadmissible to prove it. The Court is also 
precluded from considering or taking notice thereof under 
the majority rule. In Rudd v. Roger son, 424 P. 2d 776 
(Colorado, 1967), the court also considered the problem 
of pleading waiver. The court stated: 
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"A waiver of an asserted right must be affirma-
tively pleaded if it is to be used as a defense." 
The Rudd case involved an action by buyer to rescind 
a contract for the purchase of cattle from defendant on 
the grounds of breach of warranty by defendant. The 
court found that there had been no waiver of the right 
to rescind, shown by the plaintiff's conduct, and that even 
if a showing had been made that his conduct amounted 
to waiver, the question of waiver of that right was not 
placed in issue by the pleadings. The Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, rule 8(c), sets out the statutory law on pleading 
of waiver: 
"In pleading . . . a party shall set forth affirma-
affirmatively . . . waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense," 
R. C.P.Utah 8(c). 
Thus, the trial court erred in considering evidence of 
waiver since plaintiff clearly did not plead waiver. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT APPELLANT WAIVED THE TERMS 
OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT, BECAUSE 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THIS FINDING. 
The plaintiff had the burden of proof with respect 
to waiver, since the general rule is that the party seeking 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to establish waiver must prove the facts on which he re-
lies. Plaintiff did not meet this burden. 
The general rule is that waiver of an agreement or 
condition thereof cannot be found unless the evidence 
shows knowledge of the rights involved and a clear inten-
tion to waive them. This general rule was stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in 1936, in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 
et a/., 90 Utah 187, 61 P. 2d 308, in which the court said: 
"A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right . . . To constitute a waiver, there 
must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, 
a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it. It must be distinctly made . . ." 
The facts in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, were similar 
to the facts in the present case. In the Phoenix case, the 
defendants, agents of plaintiff insurance company, were 
told by plaintiff to reduce the amount of a policy they 
had issued covering a certain building. The insurance 
company's instructions to its agents made it clear that 
agents were under an obligation to cancel promptly when 
told to do so or they would render themselves personally 
liable to the company for any loss. The defendants wrote 
to the plaintiff asking plantiff to reconsider the reduction. 
The plaintiff responded by letter that their original order 
stood. However, the insured building was destroyed be-
fore plaintiff's letter was received by the defendants. De-
fendants contended that the plaintiff's delayed letter, 
responding to their request, for reconsideration constituted 
a waiver of its demand. The Court found, as discussed 
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above, that no waiver was established since plaintiffs did 
not intend to relinquish their right. There was nothing 
in the plaintiff's letter itself or in the act of sending a 
letter to indicate an intent to waive the right of insisting 
upon agent's compliance. 
In the present case the Bank had a right just as the 
Phoenix Ins, Co. did. Its right to a draft established by 
the terms of the Letter of Credit could not be waived with 
any less of a showing of clear intent to waive than in 
Phoenix. Bank made payment to Titanium under the first 
letter of guarantee dated, May 28, 1968, which letter re-
quired only that an invoice be presented. 
The Bank manager testified: 
"Q. Okay. Now, refer r ing to Exhibit 1-P, 
did you receive invoices? 
"A. Yes, sir,, 
"Q. And were they paid. 
"A. Yes, sir., 
* • 
* 
"Q. And what was the line of credit? 
,. "A. The line of credit was that we would 
approve invoices payable up to a maximum of 
$15,000 for definite purposes stated" (R. 165). 
Bank made no payments when the second and third 
letters were in effect. All payments that were received 
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by Titanium was as a result of cashier checks purchased 
by Space Metals, Inc. and Space Metals, Inc. in each case 
was listed on the cashier check as "Purchaser". 
Mr. Williams, Space Metals President, stated: 
"Oh, took a company check, and as soon as the 
funds were available in the Bank, and then pur-
chased the cashier checks, and the bank sent it 
on to Titanium Metals. (R. 184, R. 45, 47, 48 
and Exhibitl3-B.) 
Bank made no payments when the second and third 
letters of credit were in effect. Farrel Anderson, Bank 
Officer, testified: 
"Q. Do you know of any case where the 
bank advanced a specific amount to pay an in-
voice? That is after your agreement? 
"A. No, sir" (R. 168). 
These second and third Letters of Credit specifically 
required presentation of a collection "draft" before pay-
ment would be made. There was no manifestation of a 
distinct intention to relinquish this right. The act of pay-
ment by Valley Bank and Trust Company under the first 
letter of credit, really has no relation to the second and 
third letters of credit. The payment to Titanium made 
by appellant under the different terms of the first Letter 
of Guarantee can certainly not be deemed a valid waiver 
of different rights under the second and third Letters of 
Credit. According to the test of waiver established in 
Phoenix, the bank would have had to intend this act to 
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relinquish the right to a draft, and this was clearly not 
the case. In the first instance a draft was not required 
(as it was in all subsequent cases covered by the second 
and third Letters of Credit). 
There is no evidence to support a finding of waiver. 
Waiver must be clearly proved. It cannot be inferred by 
the court. The evidence in the record does not disclose 
any waiver at all. 
POINT III. 
A LETTER OF CREDIT, BEING A LETTER 
OF GUARANTY, MUST BE STRICTLY CON-
STRUED, WITH EFFECT GIVEN TO THE 
CONDITIONS WHICH THE PARTY TO BE 
CHARGED HAS SPECIFIED. 
The Letters of Credit dated October 8, 1968, and 
March 3, 1969, agree to make payments upon presenta-
tion of "collection drafts" (R. 38 and 39). The parties 
have stipulated that no drafts were ever sent to Valley 
Bank and Trust Co. by Titanium (R. 35). This require-
ment of draft presentation is an essential requirement of 
the Letter of Credit. The statutory law requires that 
there be adherence to the essential terms of a Letter of 
Credit. The rule is described in "Uniform Laws Anno-
tated", a West Publishing Company consolidation of the 
various Uniform Commercial Codes. The rule stated is, 
"(1) Generally — essential requirements of a letter of 
credit must be strictly complied with." (§ 5-104 Note 1; 
§ 5-103 Note 1.) 
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The case law also supports the proposition that a 
bank is not liable under a Letter of Credit unless there 
is strict compliance with the specific terms appearing on 
the face of the Letter of Credit. In North American Man-
ufacturer's Export Assoc, Inc. v. Chase National Bank 
of City of New York, 77 F. Supp. 55 (1948), a fact situa-
tion not unlike the present one was involved. The bank 
in the North America Mfrs. Export case, stood in no con-
tractual relationship with the plaintiff except as expressed 
in a letter of credit. The court, Judge Medina, held that 
the Letter of Credit controlled as to both parties' obliga-
tions and that plaintiff had failed to meet its require-
ments The court stated the rule with great clarity, 
" . . . A bank which issues a Letter of Credit is 
liable to the person in whose favor the credit is 
issued only upon strict compliance with the re-
quirements therein stated" (p. 56). 
There are other cases which require strict compliance (R. 
81). Typical of such cases is Banco Espanolde Credito 
v. State Street Bank, 266 F. Supp. 106. In that case the 
letter of credit involved required that the draft contain 
a certificate "that the goods are in conformity with the 
order." The certificate indicated "conforming to the con-
ditions on the stock order sheets." The court held that 
this disparity justified the bank in not honoring the draft. 
There is no question that Titanium, although familiar 
with the use of drafts, did not forward any drafts to Val-
ley Bank and Trust Co. (R. 148). It is also uncontro-
verted that Valley Bank and Trust Co. did not honor any 
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invoices as though they were drafts (R. 166-200), under 
the terms of the Letters of Credit of October 8, 1968, and 
March 3, 1969 (Exhibits 2 and 3). Instead, Valley Bank 
and Trust Co., required in each case, that its customer 
supply the money to pay the invoices (R. 168, 184). 
A draft is defined by Utah Code Annotated, 70A-3-
104, as "an order" to pay a certain sum which is signed by 
the drawer (Exhibit 18-D). None of the invoices which 
were submitted by Titanium contained the signature of 
the drawer (Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). The invoices were 
directed to Space Metals, Inc. rather than to Valley Bank 
and Trust Company. A copy of the invoice, directed to 
Space Metals, Inc., was forwarded "C/O Valley Bank and 
Trust Company" (R. 34). Titanium's invoice copy is 
stamped, "Please Remit to Titanium Metals Corporation 
of America . . ." (Exhibit 5 through 10). Even in the 
event that this language is determined to be a request 
or order to pay, the order could not be deemed to refer 
to Valley Bank and Trust Company since the invoice was 
directed to Space Metals, Inc. 
The Honorable Clark L. Derrick writing for the 
Arizona Law Review Volume 12, in 1970 discussed a land-
mark case, Asociacion de Azucareos de Gutemala v. 
United States National Bank of Oregon, 423 F. 2d 638 
(9th Cir. 1970), which again held that strict compliance 
with the terms of the Letter of Credit was required. The 
court in this case noted that if the bank had been lax in 
requiring strict compliance before making payment, then 
the bank would also have failed to satisfy the require-
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ments of the Letter of Credit, and would have been liable 
to its customer or would have been unable to recoup the 
funds it expended, from its customer (R. A94). The court 
in making this comment was recognizing the importance 
of compliance with the terms of a Letter of Credit from 
the bank's point of view. 
The Utah Code Annotated 70A-5-111 specifically dis-
cusses the importance of requiring a draft in a Letter of 
Credit. 
70A-5-111 "(1) Unless otherwise agreed 
the beneficiary by transfering or presenting a 
documentary draft or demand for payment war-
rants to all interested parties that the necessary 
conditions of the credit have been complied with. 
This is in addition to any warranties arising un-
der chapters 3, 4, 7, and 8." 
This provision from the code makes it clear that presen-
tation of a draft is a material condition of the Letter of 
Credit, with which the plaintiff was required to comply. 
The Court can not treat conditions upon which parties 
have agreed lightly, as immaterial, or subject to uninten-
tional relinquishment. In this case there are established 
commercial procedures that are important from the stand-
point of Valley Bank and Trust Co.'s relationship with 
the customers, with third parties, with governmental 
agencies, and with its internal activity. For example, 
when Valley Bank and Trust Company receives a draft 
it is accorded a warranty, under 70A-5-111 Utah Code, 
that the goods conform. Valley Bank is clearly entitled 
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to this protection which was expressly covered in the 
Letters of Credit. There has been no compliance with the 
condition of the Letter of Credit therefore Bank has no 
liability. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING 
AND DECIDING THE CASE ON A THEORY 
WHICH WAS NOT PLED NOR REVEALED 
TO, NOR DISCUSSED WITH THE PARTIES 
UNTIL AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE 
TRIAL. 
It is clear from the record that waiver was not pled 
by plaintiff. There was no evidence offered on waiver. 
Significantly, the issue of waiver was not raised or dis-
cussed during the trial. At no time did the court reveal 
to appellants' counsel that waiver was an issue and thus 
afford appellant an opportunity to meet it during the 
course of trial. This is a classical example of the error 
which resultsvfrom failure to give notice of a theory, and 
an opportunity to prepare for it. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in finding waiver. The plaintiff, 
Titanium Metals Corporation had the burden of pleading 
and proving waiver. Plaintiff did not meet this burden. 
The only reference to waiver was at the court's initiation. 
The requisite intent to relinquish a right which is the re-
quired condition needed to establish a legally sufficient 
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waiver, was not shown by plaintiff. A waiver can not be 
inferred. 
According to the existing statutory and case law 
there must be strict compliance with the condition of a 
Letter of Credit. 
In this case there is not only a failure to strictly com-
ply with the terms of the Letter of Credit, there is com-
plete failure of compliance! The essential requirement 
of the Letters of Credit was the forwarding of a draft. 
This requirement was of vital importance to the bank as 
a protection to insure that it could receive payment from 
its customer. The bank is primarily liable on a Letter of 
Credit and therefore if a draft had been received the Bank 
automatically would have issued its check in payment 
therefor under the terms of the Letter of Credit, (R. 201) 
and would have immediately taken steps to assure the 
repayment of the advance. Since no demand had been 
made on the bank it assumed, and had the right to assume, 
that Space Metals, Inc. and Titanium had made other 
credit arrangements and were not calling wkm the bank 
under its Letter of Credit. Therefore the Bank had no 
reason to attempt to protect itself by taking additional 
action to garner assets of Space Metals, Inc. 
The conditions of the agreement were important to 
the parties and especially to the bank who in a three 
paragraph letter extended a substantial line of credit. 
This line of credit was extended to Titanium without con-
sideration from it and the Bank has the right to demand 
strict compliance with its credit requirements. The trial 
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court should have simply enforced the agreement as it 
had been written. Valley Bank and Trust Company de-
cided a draft was important and so they made this re-
quirement an integral part of the Letter of Credit. The 
plaintiff, Titanium, failed to comply with this simple re-
quirement and is therefore not entitled to the benefit of 
the Bank's credit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BIELE, JONES, 
MURPHY^HASLAM 
\Li^& 
Attorneys for 
Defendants and Appellants 
80 West Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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